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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FIRST AMENDMENT-ACCESS TO GOVERN-
MENT PROCEEDINGS- Voir Dire OF JURORS-Press-Enterprise Co.
v. Superior Court of Cal.-The amendments to the Constitution
provide a list of human rights. Among these guaranteed rights
are freedom of speech and the press,1 as well as the right to a
public trial by an impartial jury.2 The Constitution guarantees
rights which, although not enumerated, are nonetheless consid-
ered to be fundamental.3 Inherent in the first amendment, in
conjunction with the fourteenth,4 is the public's right of access
to information concerning the government 5 and, in particular,
the right to know how criminal trials and the system of justice
function.6 This interest may conflict with other constitutional
rights, in particular an accused's right to a fair trial as guaran-
teed by the sixth amendment. When human rights, embodied in
certain amendments, are protected without consideration for
other ones, important interests are infringed. Therefore, when
amendments appear to conflict, it is necessary to balance all in-
volved interests. The Supreme Court, while refusing to establish
a priority as between the first and sixth amendments, did extend
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Govern-
ment for a redress of grievances."
2. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The sixth amendment provides, in part: "In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impar-
tial jury ... ." Accord U.S. CONST. ART. III, § 2 ("The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases
of Impeachment, shall be by Jury ... ").
3. See infra notes 49-53 and accompanying text.
4. U.S. CONST. amends. I and XIV.
All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the ju-
risdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they
reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. § 1.
5. Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 575 (1980). Chief Justice Burger,
announcing the judgment of the Court, pointed out in reference to the first and four-
teenth amendments that the "expressly guaranteed freedoms share a common core pur-
pose of assuring freedom of communication on matters relating to the functioning of
government." Id. at 575.
6. Id.
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the right of public access to governmental information to include
the voir dire of prospective jurors in Press-Enterprise Co. v. Su-
perior Court of Cal.7 Noting that the selection of the jury is pre-
sumptively a public process,8 the Supreme Court held that this
"presumption of openness may be overcome only by an overrid-
ing interest based on findings that closure is essential to pre-
serve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that
interest."9
I. PRESUMPTIVE OPENNESS
A. Historical Background
The historical evidence of the proceedings in criminal trials
reveals that the "trial has been open to all who cared to ob-
serve."' 0 Furthermore, the development of the jury system" il-
7. 464 U.S. 501 (1984).
8. Id. at 505.
9. Id. at 510.
10. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 564.
11. Blackstone's opinion is evidenced by an excerpt from his COMMENTARIES:
(T]he trial by jury ever has been, and I trust will ever be, looked upon as
the glory of the English law... [I]t is the most transcendent privilege which any
subject can enjoy, or wish for, that he cannot be affected either in his property,
his liberty, or his person, but by the unanimous consent of twelve of his
neighbours and equals.
3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 379 (9th ed. 1978).
Early versions of the modern jury can be traced to England prior to the Norman
Conquest. A public official would call groups of neighbors to answer questions under
oath. 1 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME
OF EDWARD I 138 (2d ed. 1968). Gradually these questions came to center upon disputed
facts, knowledge of which the jurors either already possessed or could easily attain. In
this sense they served as witnesses, but their decisions were binding upon the parties
involved. 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 317 (7th ed. 1956). See also 6 J.
WIGMORE, EvIDENCE § 1800 (3d ed. 1940). As this system evolved after the Norman Con-
quest, the jurors began to serve more as impartial triers of fact, rather than as witnesses
to the events at issue and as such, they could be challenged. 1 W. HOLDSWORTH at 332.
While objections to prospective jurors could be made based on personal hostility, it was
not until the fourteenth century that petit jurors could be challenged, according to stat-
ute, because of their participating as an indicator on the jury. See id. at 324-325. For a
discussion of the historical development of the jury trial in the Anglo-American system,
see generally, 3 W. BLACKSTONE, supra, at 349-85; 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra, at 312-50; E.
JENKS, A SHORT HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 46-55 (3d ed. 1924); A.H. MANCHESTER, A MOD-
ERN LEGAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND AND WALES 1750-1950 at 86-99 (1980); 1 F. POLLOCK &
F. MAITLAND, supra, at 138- 53; RADCLIFFE & CROSS, THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 66-91
(6th ed. 1977); 6 J. WIGMORE, supra, at § 1800.
The evolution of the procedure of trial by jury bears a close connection to the public
COMMENTS ,
lustrates that it presumptively has also been a process to which
the public has had access. 12 While there are not many written
records concerning the public nature of the early trial, the Su-
preme Court in Press-Enterprise's discussed an account written
by Sir Thomas Smith in 1565 in which he notes that trials were
held in an open or common place, and that only the "endite-
ment" was recorded.
All the rest is doone openlie in the presence of the
Judges, the Justices, the enquest, the prisoner, and so
manie as will or can come so neare as to heare it, and all
depositions and witnesses given aloude, that all men may
heare from the mouth of the depositors and witnesses
what is saide."'
Relying on Sir Thomas Smith's version of the trial proceedings,
the Court in Press-Enterprise notes, "[i]f we accept this account
it appears that beginning in the sixteenth century, jurors were
selected in public.""5
While the tradition of public trials in the United States can
be traced back to the common law system in England, there is
evidence that the public nature of trials first became a part of
our legal system during the colonial period.16 Our Founding Fa-
thers, as well as our English ancestors, had good reason to dis-
trust trials and proceedings which were held in secret, for they
had only to recall the abuse and excess of the Spanish Inquisi-
tion, the English Court of Star Chamber, and the French lettre
character of the trials themselves. As one observer has noted:
[A "public" trial] seems almost a necessary incident of jury trials, since the
presence of a jury ... already insured the presence of a large part of the public.
We need scarcely be reminded that the jury was the patria, the "country" and
that it was in that capacity and not as judges, that it was summoned.
Radin, The Right to a Public Trial, 6 TEMP. L.Q. 381, 388 (1932) [hereinafter cited as
Radin, Public Trial]. See, e.g., 3 W. BLACKSTONE, supra, at 349 ("the trial by jury; called
also the trial per pais, or by the country").
12. Press-Enterprise v. Superior Court of Cal., 464 U.S. 501 at 506.
13. Id. at 508.
14. Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting T. SMITH, DE REPUBLICA ANGLORUM 96 (Alston
ed. 1906)). See also Radin, Public Trial, supra note 11, at 382.
15. 464 U.S. 501 at 507. See also E. JENKS, supra note 11, at 73-74. ("[O]ne of the
most conspicuous features of English justice, that all judicial trials are held in open
court, to which the public have free access... appears to have been the rule in England
from time immemorial").
16. See In Re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 266-67 (1948); Press-Enterprise, 464 U.S. at 508.
1985]
202 HUMAN RIGHTS ANNUAL [Vol. III
de cachet of the Ancien Regime.'" Drawing upon our common
law heritage, the sixth amendment to the Constitution guaran-
tees a person who is criminally charged the right to a public trial
by an impartial jury.'8 At the time this amendment was adopted,
the guarantee of a public trial pertained only to federal criminal
prosecutions, but in 1948, in the case of In Re Oliver, it was
deemed to be applicable to state criminal proceedings through
the fourteenth amendment.' 9 Likewise, another sixth amend-
17. Cf. Oliver, 333 U.S. at 268-69 nn.21-23 (noting, in part, that different aspects of
the proceedings conducted by these tribunals were done secretly); Radin, Public Trial,
supra note 11 at 386-89. Radin points out that Parliamentary opponents to the Star
Chamber did not focus on the secrecy aspect and, in fact, there are some grounds for
belief that this court did not conduct proceedings secretly. What apparently caused Par-
liament concern was the fact that the Star Chamber possessed as much power as it did,
rather than how it exercised that power. Radin questions not the evils of secret trials,
but whether secret trials did exist in England. He places more weight upon the lettre de
cachet in influencing the Framers of the Constitution:
[In] the eighteenth century the evil reputation of lettres de cachet and per-
haps the horrendous picture of the "Spanish Inquisition," gave the "open and
public trial" of the common law something of an odor of sanctity. It certainly
was not a deliberately planned safeguard against the dangers incident upon se-
crecy. But, however it arose, it has found formulation as a constitutional right in
almost every state, and in the Constitution. While the historical foundation cre-
ated for it is purely mythical, the rationalization which the courts have at-
tempted must be accepted and its implications examined.
Radin, Public Trial at 389.
18. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. See supra note 2.
19. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273. In this case, the petitioner was subpoenaed to
appear before a Michigan circuit judge, who was conducting a one-man grand jury inves-
tigation, pursuant to state law. After petitioner's testimony, the judge determined he was
in contempt of court and consequently convicted and sentenced him to serve sixty days
in jail. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner's trial and conviction, in grand jury
secrecy, without affording him the rights to counsel, to prepare his defense, to call wit-
nesses on his behalf, and to cross-examine the witness who testified against him, consti-
tuted a denial of due process of law under the fourteenth amendment. The Court noted:
In view of this nation's historic distrust of secret proceedings, their inherent
dangers to freedom, and the universal requirement of our federal and state gov-
ernments that criminal trials be public, the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee
that no one shall be deprived of his liberty without due process of law means at
least that an accused cannot be thus sentenced to prison.
Id.
Radin wrote his article, The Right to a Public Trial, in 1932, which was sixteen
years before the Supreme Court decided In Re Oliver. At that time, Radin observed that,
while the sixth amendment did not pertain to state court proceedings, almost all state
constitutions contained a provision similar to that of the federal Constitution. Radin,
Public Trial at 386. Citing a passage from Davis v. United States, 247 F.2d 394, 395 (8th
Cir. 1917), Radin emphasizes that some states viewed the right to a public trial almost as
an unqualified right:
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ment provision, that which entitles an accused to a trial by jury,
was expanded to include within its scope state criminal proceed-
ings. In Duncan v. Louisiana,2 ° the Court held:
Because we believe that trial by jury in criminal cases is
fundamental to the American scheme of justice, we held
that the fourteenth amendment guarantees a right of jury
trial in all criminal cases which-were they to be tried in
a federal court-would come within the sixth amend-
ment's guarantee.2 '
B. Jurisprudential Value
Two important constitutional values have emerged: the
right to a trial by jury and the public nature of such a trial.2 2
The provision (sc. the sixth amendment) is one of the important safeguards
that were soon deemed necessary to round out the Constitution, and it was due
to the historical warnings of the evil practice of the Star Chamber in England.
The corrective influence of public attendance at trials for crime was considered
important to the liberty of the people, and it is only by steadily supporting the
safeguard that it is kept from being undermined and finally destroyed.
Radin, Public Trial at 386.
20. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
21. Id. at 149. The decision in this case was rendered on May 20, 1968. At that time,
the constitution of the State of Louisiana permitted a jury trial only in cases in which
the sentencing could include imprisonment at hard labor or capital punishment. Since
Duncan was convicted of simple battery, which is a misdemeanor in Louisiana, the trial
judge refused to grant Duncan's request for a trial by jury. Following his conviction,
Duncan was sentenced to 60 days in prison and, in addition, fined $150. Duncan ap-
pealed, alleging that his constitutional rights had been violated because he had been
denied a jury trial. The Louisiana Supreme Court did not agree with appellant and did
not grant him a writ of certiorari. Id. at 146. Appellant then sought review in the Su-
preme Court, which granted certiorari. Id. at 147.
22. See supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text. The applicability of the Bill of
Rights of the Constitution to the individual states, through the fourteenth amendment,
has been a topic of much debate. The Supreme Court has viewed an infringement of
many of the rights which are safeguarded by the first eight amendments, regardless of
whether on the federal or state levels, as a denial of due process of law. In an extensive
discussion concerning the meaning of the fourteenth amendment's "due process of law"
in Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897), Justice
Harlan noted: "In determining what is due process of law regard must be had to sub-
stance, not to form." Id. at 235. In that case, the fourteenth amendment was held to
protect the right to compensation for property taken by the State. Id. at 241. Other cases
expanded the constitutional rights protected by the fourteenth amendment: Powell v.
Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67 (1932) (the sixth amendment guarantees an accused the right
to counsel); In Re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (the sixth amendment protects the right to a
public trial); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (the fourth amendment guarantees free-
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Together they are viewed as two of the most important factors
in the effective administration of the judicial process. In particu-
lar, the openness of trials serves to uphold the integrity of the
judicial system and to help prevent courts from being used as
"instruments of persecution. 2 3 As the Supreme Court noted in
In Re Oliver,2 4 "[tihe knowledge that every criminal trial is sub-
ject to contemporaneous review in the forum of public opinion is
an effective restraint on possible abuse of judicial power. '2 5 Fur-
ther, accessibility to these proceedings not only upholds the in-
tegrity of the judicial system, it also educates the public about
that system, 26 and builds public confidence in the adversarial
process and in judicial remedies. 27 Public proceedings help to as-
sure the accused of a fair and accurate adjudication of the is-
sues, 2  demonstrate the fairness of the law, and point out that
procedural rights are protected.2 '9 The open nature of the pro-
ceedings brings the case to the attention of people who may
have knowledge of the circumstances at issue and may volunteer
to testify."0 The fact that the public is in attendance at a trial
helps to prevent accusations concerning possible dishonesty on
the part of the judge," dissuades perjury 2 and impropriety on
the part of those who are involved in the proceedings, 3 and
dom from unreasonable searches and seizures, and the exclusion from trial of any ille-
gally obtained evidence); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (the fifth amendment privi-
lege against self-incrimination).
23. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270.
24. Id. at 257.
25. Id. at 270.
26. See Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 572-73; WIGMORE, supra
note 11, at § 1834; Radin, Public Trial, supra note 11 at 392.
27. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 270; Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 594-95 (Brennan,
J., concurring); WIGMORE, supra note 11 at § 1834; 1 J. BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL
EVIDENCE 524-26 (1827).
28. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 593 (Brennan, J., concurring).
29. Id. at 594-95 (Brennan, J., concurring).
30. WIGMORE, supra note 11, at § 1834.
31. BENTHAM, supra note 27 at 522. But see Radin, Public Trial, supra note 11, at
394 (noting that judges may act improperly even though people are present in the court-
room and their presence may even encourage such conduct rather than hinder it).
32. Perjury is discouraged in the sense that testifying publicly raises the possibility
that any false statement may be exposed. WIGMORE, supra note 11, at § 1834. Blackstone
also believed that perjury would be discouraged: "a witness may frequently depose that
in private, which he will be ashamed to testify in a public and solemn tribunal." BLACK-
STONE, supra note 11, at 373.
33. Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 569.
[Vol. III
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helps prevent prejudicial or biased feelings from forming the ba-
sis of decisions.34 As the Supreme Court emphasized in Press-
Enterprise:
The value of openness lies in the fact that people not ac-
tually attending trials can have confidence that standards
of fairness are being observed; the sure knowledge that
anyone is free to attend gives assurance that established
procedures are being followed and that deviations will
become known. Openness thus enhances both the basic
fairness of the criminal trial and the appearance of fair-
ness so essential to public confidence in the system."
In addition to the importance attached to having criminal
trials open to the public, there is also a "community therapeutic
34. Id. While the ultimate outcome is not the only part to be considered, it is, none-
theless, a significant object of public concern. "A result considered untoward may under-
mine public confidence, and where the trial has been concealed from public view an un-
expected outcome can cause a reaction that the system at best has failed and at worst
has been corrupted." Id. at 571.
Frequently quoted is a passage in which Bentham, over 150 years ago, recognized
the value of openness and the need for safeguards through public access to judicial
proceedings:
[S]uppose the proceedings to be completely secret, and the court, on the
occasion, to consist of no more than a single judge,-that judge will be at once
indolent and arbitrary: how corrupt soever his inclination may be, it will find no
check, at any rate no tolerably efficient check, to oppose it. Without publicity,
all other checks are insufficient: in comparison of publicity, all other checks are
of small account. Recordation, appeal, whatever other institutions might present
themselves in the character of checks, would be found to operate rather as cloaks
than checks; as cloaks in reality, as checks only in appearance.
BENTHAM, supra note 27, at 524.
35. Press-Enterprise v. Superior Court of Cal., 464 U.S. 501, 508; see also Richmond
Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 569-71. It is important to note that the Supreme
Court felt that "justice must satisfy the appearance of justice" in order for the system to
work effectively. Levin v. United States, 362 U.S. 610, 616 (1960) (quoting Offutt v.
United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954)); accord, Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368,
429 (1979) (Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting). See also Richmond, 448 U.S. at
571-72; id. at 594-95 (Brennan, J., concurring); the Supreme Court notes that institu-
tional integrity is enhanced by keeping the proceedings open to the public:
People in an open society do not demand infallibility from their institutions,
but it is difficult for them to accept what they are prohibited from observing.
When a criminal trial is conducted in the open, there is at least an opportunity
both for understanding the system in general and its workings in a particular
case.
448 U.S. at 572.
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value"36 to be considered. After a crime has been committed, es-
pecially a violent one, public reaction may be widespread and
people must have an avenue through which to vent their emo-
tions.3 7 It is a natural tendency for society to want the guilty to
be punished. 8 People want to see that justice, in fact, is done.39
Public trials provide an outlet for community concern and as-
sure people that the criminal justice system is working.40 "Pro-
ceedings held in secret would deny this outlet and frustrate the
broad public interest; by contrast, public proceedings vindicate
the concerns of the victims and the community in knowing that
offenders are being brought to account for their criminal con-
duct by jurors fairly and openly selected.""1
The Constitutional guarantees under the sixth amendment
are personal to the accused,'" and do not confer upon the public
a right of access to criminal trials.4 3 Therefore the sixth amend-
ment protections for the accused must be placed in perspective
with the guarantees of the first amendment 4' which, in conjunc-
36. 448 U.S. at 570.
37. Press Enterprises 464 U.S. at 508-09; Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 570-72.
38. 464 U.S. at 509.
39. Id. at 506-10. See also Radin, Public Trial, supra note 11, at 394.
40. Problems arise when people, caught up in the excitement and emotion of the
situation, feel that adequate measures are not being taken to uphold the laws and that a
miscarriage of justice must be prevented. As a result, they take matters into their own
hands, employing "self-help" methods such as those used by vigilante committees. Rich-
mond, 448 U.S. at 571.
41. Press Enterprise v. Superior Court of Cal. 464 U.S. 501, 509.
42. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 379-80; see Faretta v. California, 422
U.S. 806, 848 (1975) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("the specific guarantees of the sixth
amendment are personal to the accused..."); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 538-39 (1965)
("the purpose of the requirement of a public trial was to guarantee that the accused
would be fairly dealt with and not unjustly condemned."); id. at 588 (Harlan, J., concur-
ring) ("Thus the right of 'public trial' is not one belonging to the public, but one belong-
ing to the accused, and inhering in the institutional process by which justice is adminis-
tered."); id. at 583 (Warren, C.J., concurring) ("[T]he public trial provision of the sixth
amendment is a 'guarantee to an accused' designed to 'safeguard against any attempt to
employ our courts as instruments of persecution.'... A public trial is a necessary compo-
nent of an accused's right to a fair trial . . .") (quoting In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270).
43. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 379-81; id. at 381 n.9; see also Estes v.
Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 538-39; contra United States v. Cianfrani, 573 F.2d 835, 847 (3d Cir.
1978) (the right of access to all adjudicative proceedings is conferred upon the public by
the fifth and sixth amendments). See Note, The Right to Attend Criminal Hearings, 78
COLUM. L. Rav. 1308, 1321-22 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Note, The Right to Attend].
44. U.S. CONST. amend. I., see supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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tion with the fourteenth amendment,45 include the right of free-
dom of communication, especially with regard to governmental
proceedings.46 Obviously, one of the main functions of govern-
ment is the administration of justice.4 7 The first amendment not
only protects speech and press, but also prohibits the govern-
ment from limiting the source and availability of information. 8
As much as there is a constitutionally guaranteed freedom of
speech, there is also a corresponding right to listen and to "re-
ceive information and ideas. ' ' 49 Over the years, courts have up-
held many different rights which they deemed to be included
under the umbrella of the first amendment, such as the right of
peaceable assembly, 50 the right to distribute literature, 51 and the
right of access to traditionally open places, like parks, streets,
and sidewalks,52 subject, of course, to traditional time, place, and
manner restrictions.58 "What this means in the context of trials
is that the first amendment guarantees of speech and press,
standing alone, prohibit government from summarily closing
courtroom doors which had long been open to the public at the
time that amendment was adopted. 54 Since people have the
freedom of speech 5 and the right to assemble5" and traditionally
they have served a vital role in criminal proceedings, 57 it follows
that they should be accorded the right to attend criminal
trials.58
45. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
46. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
47. Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 575; see also Craig v. Harney,
331 U.S. 367, 374 (1947) (Douglas, J.) ("A trial is a public event. What transpires in the
courtroom is public property").
48. First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978).
49. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762 (1972); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557,
564 (1969) ("It is now well established that the Constitution protects the right to receive
information and ideas"); See also Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943).
50. De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937).
51. Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
52. See Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
53. See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Cox v. New Hampshire,
312 U.S. 569 (1941).
54. Richmond Newspapersv. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 576.
55. See supra note 1.
56. Id.
57. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 578. See supra notes 23-35 and accompany-
ing text.
58. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 577. ("The right of access to places tradition-
ally open to the public, as criminal trials have long been, may be seen as assured by the
1985]
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II. PRESUMPTIVE OPENNESS OF PRETRIAL PROCEEDINGS
A. Federal Circuit Court Decisions
While it is accepted, both by common law tradition and
constitutional guarantees, that a criminal trial must be open to
the public," the question of whether access should be allowed to
proceedings other than the trial itself, or exactly what proceed-
ings are considered to be part of the trial for purposes of public
access, has not alway been as clear.
Lower courts, most notably the Third Circuit, have grap-
pled with the issues of accessibility to pretrial hearings and voir
dire examinations of prospective jurors. In U.S. v. Sorrentino,0
the court held that the right to a public trial applies to the en-
tire trial, including the selection of the jury." This decision,
however, rested upon the sixth amendment,6 2 and the court
noted that "[w]hile all of these rights are in a broad sense for
the protection of the public generally they are in a very special
sense privileges accorded to the individual member of the public
who has been accused of crime." e Accordingly, many of these
"privileges," such as the right to a public trial, may be waived by
the defendant, as did happen in this case.6
This right to a public trial based upon the sixth amendment
amalgam of the first amendment guarantees of speech and press, and their affinity to the
right of assembly is not without relevance").
59. See supra notes 11-21 and accompanying text; see also Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S.
367, 374 ("What transpires in the court room is public property").
60.. 175 F.2d 721 (3d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 868 (1949), reh'g denied, 338
U.S. 896 (1949).
61. Id. at 722. In this case, an order issued by the trial judge excluded all people from
the courtroom except the jurors, attorneys, witnesses, and the press, beginning with the
first day of trial, during which the jury was selected. This order was later relaxed for the
remaining three days of trial. Sorrentino, who was convicted, along with others, of a
conspiracy to violate the Mann Act, later contested the closure order, claiming that he
was denied his right to a public trial. The Court stated that the right to a public trial
"applies to the entire trial, including that portion devoted to the selection of the jury."
Sorrentino's constitutional rights were not violated, however, because he, in fact, had
waived his right to a public trial by not objecting to the closure order. Id. at 723.
.62. Id. at 722.
63. Id. at 722-23.
64. Id. at 723. Cf. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 382 ("While the sixth
amendment guarantees to a defendant in a criminal case the right to a public trial, it
does not guarantee the right to compel a private trial"). See e.g., U.S. v. Cianfrani, 573
F.2d 835, 852.
208 [Vol. III
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has also been held to encompass pretrial hearings.as Chief Judge
Seitz of the Third Circuit began his analysis in U.S. v. Cian-
frani" emphasizing that there is a strong presumption that the
public has access to all judicial proceedings.6 7 Concluding that
the sixth amendment guarantee to a public trial extended to the
pretrial suppression" and Starks hearingss in this case, Chief
Judge Seitz went on to consider the appropriate limitations that
should be placed upon this presumption and the importance of
public access to adjudicative proceedings. 70 The court held that:
[A]ny motion that seeks to close any portion of a pro-
ceeding subject to the public trial requirement of the
65. Cianfrani, 573 F.2d 835, disapproved on other grounds; Gannett, 443 U.S. at 382
n.9 (criticized for its departure from the plain meaning of the sixth amendment). See
Note, The Right to Attend, supra note 43 at 1321-22.
66. 573 F.2d 835. This case concerned the trial of Henry J. Cianfrani ("defendant"), a
well-known politician from Philadelphia, who was indicted by a federal grand jury for
violations of federal law in connection with his alleged misconduct while in public office.
The 110 count indictment included charges for mail fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1341); racketeer-
ing (18 U.S.C. §§ 1961, 1962(c)); income tax evasion (26 U.S.C. § 7201); and obstruction
of justice (18 U.S.C. § 1503). The pretrial suppression and Starks hearings (see infra
note 69) were of special significance because they involved the federal wiretapping stat-
ute (Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §
2510 et seq.) and the public was excluded from them. At these in camera proceedings,
the defendant stipulated that the tapes had been recorded with the permission of one of
the parties involved and that the government had met all the requirements of Starks.
The end result was that Cianfrani pleaded guilty to all counts, except he pleaded nolo
contendere to income tax evasion, and thus the "trial" concluded with the plea hearing
and sentencing of the defendant. 573 F.2d at 841-44.
67. Cianfrani, 573 F.2d at 847. Chief Judge Seitz relied upon the fifth amendment
(due process clause) and, most importantly, the sixth amendment (public trial provision)
for support for this presumption.
68. For other decisions which have held that pretrial suppression hearings are subject
to the sixth amendment's guarantee to a public trial see United States ex rel. Bennett v.
Rundle, 419 F.2d 599 (3d Cir. 1969) (pretrial suppression hearing concerning the volun-
tariness of defendant's confession); United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077 (E.D.N.Y.
1971) (pretrial hearing concerning the admissibility at trial of narcotics seized by police
from defendant); see also United States v. Clark, 475 F.2d 240, 247 (2d Cir. 1973) (exclu-
sion of defendant and public from hearing on motion to suppress drugs which were
seized at an airport terminal security check (to prevent hijacking) violated defendant's
sixth amendment rights).
69. A Starks hearing requires that in order to introduce tape recordings into evidence
at trial, the party intending to so offer must prove, by clear and convincing evidence,
that the tapes are accurate and authentic, and furthermore, the party should show that
those conversations were voluntary, and made in good faith, without any inducement.
United States v. Starks, 515 F.2d 112, 121 & n.11 (3d Cir. 1975).
70. U.S. v. Cianfrani, 573 F.2d 835, 851-61.
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sixth amendment, or to seal any portion of the record
thereof, may be granted only after full and fair considera-
tion by the court of the important public policies that the
sixth amendment protects. This is required even though
it be the defendant who seeks to exclude the public. 1
Thus, according to the Third Circuit, it is only under excep-
tional circumstances that even a part of a criminal trial may be
subject to consideration for closure, and even then "only that
portion of the public may be excluded for only that portion of
the proceeding that the court finds to be strictly and inescapably
necessary to protect the interests asserted by the defendant in
support of his motion to close a hearing subject to the public
trial requirement. 7 2
In its discussion, the court pointed out that there are no
"hard and fast" rules which could be used in determining which
hearings should be closed, or the length of such closure.7 This is
a decision which district courts must make in each separate situ-
ation.74 In particular, the court of appeals did not believe that
limited access to a pretrial suppression hearing, as set out in this
case, infringed the first amendment rights of the public or the
press. 5
Rather than relying on the sixth amendment, the District
Court in United States v. Dorfman,7 6 based its decision on the
first amendment, holding that this amendment creates a pre-
sumptive right of access to the pretrial suppression hearing77 for
71. Id. at 854.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 858.
74. Id. In the Cianfrani case, the evidence which the defendant sought to suppress
involved tapes of intercepted communications. The court of appeals, recognizing that the
privacy of communications justifies some limitation on access, felt that some protection
against disclosure of the content of these tapes, or any evidence derived therefrom, was
permissible, but that the district court's closure of the hearing and sealing of the record
was too broad. Id. at 857, 859. Once the trial court decided that these communications
were lawfully intercepted (which was the only portion of the hearing which dealt with
the actual contents of the tapes) the public could have been allowed to attend the hear-
ing without any problem of the content of the communications being made public. Id. at
857-60.
75. Id. at 861.
76. 550 F. Supp. 877 (N.D. Ill., E.D. 1982). This case concerned a multi-count indict-
ment which included charges of conspiracy to bribe a United States senator.
77. Id. at 884.
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both the public and the press. In this case, the court denied a
motion to close the evidentiary hearing, but received all the sur-
veillance materials under seal as exhibits. 78 After determining
that almost all of the electronic surveillance was lawful, the
court entertained a motion to unseal these exhibits. 79 Acknowl-
edging that "there is a common law right to inspect and copy
judicial records,"80 the district court found that the record of the
case included exhibits which were introduced at an evidentiary
hearing.8 1 Judge Marshall of the district court gave a brief anal-
78. Id. at 879.
79. Id. at 880.
80. Id. The record of a case has been held to include the exhibits which were intro-
duced at an evidentiary hearing. See U.S. v. Hubbard, 650 F.2d 293, 299 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
Of course, it must be remembered that:
[T]he right to inspect and copy judicial records is not absolute....
[T]he decision as to access is one best left to the sound discretion of the
trial court, a discretion to be exercised in light of the relevant facts and circum-
stances of the particular case.
Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 598-99 (1978) (footnote omitted),
quoted in U.S. v. Hubbard, 650 F.2d 293, 315-16.
81. U.S. v. Dorfman, 550 F. Supp. 877, 880. These sealed exhibits were central to the
suppression hearing and, therefore, a vital component of the case, as well. As such, the
district court deemed that they were subject to the common law right of access. The
significance of pretrial hearings is more fully discussed herein. See infra notes 113-14
and accompanying text.
Citing U.S. v. Hubbard, 650 F.2d 293, the district court noted that an exception may
be made to the common law right of access "where the documents sought are essentially
irrelevant to the issues at the evidentiary hearing." 550 F. Supp. at 880. In Hubbard the
exception centered around unique circumstances involving the defendants, who were offi-
cials or employees of the Church of Scientology. Certain documents were introduced,
under seal, at a pretrial suppression hearing for the purposes of proving the defendants'
contention that many of the documents were not relevant to the proceedings and that
the search and seizure of the documents was unlawful in that it exceeded the scope of
the warrant. 650 F.2d at 316. The court of appeals determined that the seal should not
have been lifted since these materials were not found to be relevant to the charges in this
case and they were not used in the trial. Id. at 321. Furthermore, the district court did
not substantiate any reasons favoring public access, and the court of appeals, upon
weighing only the generalized interests, found that the trial court abused its discretion
by unsealing the documents. Id. at 317. In addition, the circuit court pointed out that
the public did have access to various portions of the proceedings surrounding this case
including, among others, the memoranda and hearing on the motion to suppress, the
judge's memorandum decision in connection therewith, as well as the "stipulated record
which was the basis for the defendants' convictions and to the actual 'trial' of the crimi-
nal charges of which the defendants were convicted." Id. at 317-18. Contra Judge MacK-
innon's dissenting opinion in Hubbard in which he concluded that disclosure was
warranted:
[T]he requirement for public disclosure of the evidentiary record in a court
proceeding which results in a judicial ruling naturally flows from the constitu-
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ysis of the Supreme Court's encounters with the issue of access
to judicial proceedings under the first amendment 2 and con-
cluded that the bulk of the sealed material did not bear upon
the offenses contained in the indictment, and thus could be re-
leased immediately.8 " There were other sealed exhibits that were
viewed as being directly related to the charges of the indictment
which, if released, would probably be subject to pretrial public-
ity and might hamper the selection of an impartial jury.84 These
exhibits were to be kept under seal "only until the jury is im-
paneled and sworn."8' 5 The district court balanced all involved
interests and determined that once the defendants' rights to a
fair trial were adequately protected by a proper voir dire and
instructions to the jury, the seal could be removed and the peo-
ple of the community, as well as the press, would have access to
this material without having to wait until the conclusion of the
trial.86
In In re United States ex rel. Pulitzer Pub. Co.8 7 the Eighth
Circuit was faced with determining whether an in-chambers voir
dire was constitutionally valid. The court decided that this type
of voir dire was inappropriate in the absence of any inquiry as to
alternate solutions, in the absence of a recognition of any right
under the Constitution for the public or the press to attend the
voir dire proceedings, and, most importantly, in the absence in
the record of any articulated reasons for, and balancing of, inter-
tional requirement that the trial be public. Even though a motion to suppress
may not be a "trial" there is no difference in the ultimate requirement that the
record be public. A judicial proceeding cannot be said to be public if the public
be denied access to the evidence admitted as relevant to the issues before the
court. It is as important to public disclosure of judicial proceedings that the
public be able to read written evidence in the record as it is that they be able to
hear oral testimony.
650 F.2d at 330 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
82. U.S. v. Dorfman, 550 F. Supp. 877, 883, reviewing Gannett Co. v. DePasquale,
443 U.S. 368; Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555; Globe Newspaper Co. v.
Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
83. 550 F. Supp. at 886.
84. Id. at 886-87.
85. Id. at 887.
86. Id. at 887-88. The Court, holding that the exhibits could not be kept sealed for
reasons of privacy, noted that it had already considered this aspect of the surveillance
which was unduly intrusive into the privacy of those who were being monitored, for that
portion of the material was suppressed at the hearing.
87. 635 F.2d 676 (8th Cir. 1980).
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ests of the public in having access to criminal proceedings versus
the right of the parties therein to a fair trial."8 The circuit court
granted the petition for a writ of mandamus to prevent the trial
court from conducting the voir dire in camera solely because the
district judge failed "to announce his reasons for the decision to
close the voir dire proceedings and . . .to balance the right of
the public to attend the trial against the right of the defendant
to a fair trial in accordance with the principles announced in
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia."'" The court pointed
out the need to balance the sixth amendment guarantee to a fair
trial, which outweighed the right of the public to attend criminal
proceedings in Gannett Co. v. DePasquale,90 and the holding in
Richmond, 1 which concluded that the public's right of access to
a criminal trial is protected by the first amendment.2
B. Supreme Court Decisions
One of the Supreme Court's first encounters with the issue
of access to judicial proceedings was in Gannett Co. v. DePas-
quale.'e This case concerned the validity of an order which
closed to the public a pretrial hearing involving a motion to sup-
press specific physical evidence and alleged involuntary confes-
sions.9 4 In a 5-4 decisions" the Court affirmed the order, holding
that the sixth amendment guarantees no right of the public or
the press to attend pretrial hearings." Justice Stewart, speaking
88. Id. at 677.
89. Id. at 678 (citing Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555).
90. 443 U.S. 368.
91. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. 555.
92. See Pulitzer, 635 F.2d at 677-79.
93. 443 U.S. 368. Prior to this case, the Supreme Court addressed, in a series of cases,
access to prisons and concluded that the press did not have any rights superior to those
afforded the public generally. E.g., Houchins v. KQED, 438 U.S. 1 (1978); Saxbe v.
Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974). But cf.
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972). The Court noted, in dictum: "Nor is it
suggested that news gathering does not qualify for First Amendment protection; without
some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated."
94. 443 U.S. at 374-75, 377.
95. Id. at 370. Chief Justice Burger, Justices Powell, Rehnquist, and Stevens joined
in Justice Stewart's opinion for the Court. Chief Justice Burger, Justices Powell and
Rehnquist filed concurring opinions. Justice Blackmun, concurring in part and dissenting
in part, filed an opinion in which he was joined by Justices Brennan, White, and
Marshall.
96. Id. at 394. The trial judge had concluded that if the suppression hearing were
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for the majority, stated that courts must take adequate mea-
sures to protect an accused's right to due process,' 7 which often
includes minimizing pretrial publicity by closing pretrial
proceedings.' 8
Justice Stewart emphasized that the sixth amendment guar-
antees the defendant in a criminal proceeding, among other
things, the right to a speedy and public trial,99 but he also noted
that the Constitution does not provide for a public right of ac-
cess to a criminal trial. 00 This sixth amendment right to a pub-
lic trial is "personal to the accused."'' Nevertheless, the sixth
amendment does not confer upon the defendant the right to a
private trial. 0 2 The Court acknowledged the importance attrib-
uted to public trials, as well as the public's interest "in having a
criminal case heard by a jury, an interest distinct from the de-
fendant's interest in being tried by a jury of his peers.' 03 How-
ever, once a defendant waives his right to a jury trial,' 0 ' there is
no right on the part of the public to insist that he have a trial by
jury, regardless of the societal interest attached thereto.'
open, there would be a reasonable likelihood that the defendants would be prejudiced by
the pretrial publicity and, therefore, the closure order was necessary to protect the de-
fendants' right to a fair trial. Id. at 376.
97. Id. at 378-79. E.g., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966); Irvin v. Dowd, 366
U.S. 717 (1961). Cf. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532.
98. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 378-79.
99. Id. at 379, 386-87.
100. Id. at 379.
101. Id. at 379-81 (quoting Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 848 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting), and at 381-82 n.9. See also, In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257; Note, The Right To
Attend, supra note 43 at 1326.
102. 443 U.S. at 382. Defendants cannot compel closure but, as in this case, they may
move for closure. When defendants requested that the hearing be closed, neither the
District Attorney nor Gannett's reporter objected to the motion, which the trial judge
then granted. The judge also reserved his decision concerning release of the transcript,
which prompted Gannett to move the court to vacate the exclusionary order. Id. at 375-
76. Ruling that "the interest of the press and the public was outweighed in this case by
the defendants' right to a fair trial," the trial judge refused to allow the suppression
hearing to be open. Id. at 376.
103. Id. at 383.
104. Cf. FED. R. CriM. P. 23(a) (defendant may waive a jury trial, provided that the
court and prosecution consent).
105. 443 U.S. at 384. See also id. at 383:
Recognition of an independent public interest in the enforcement of sixth
amendment guarantees is a far cry, however, from the creation of a constitu-
tional right on the part of the public. In an adversary system of criminal justice,
the public interest in the administration of justice is protected by the partici-
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The Court placed great reliance upon the proposition that
the public's interest in the efficient administration of justice is
fully protected by the adversary system. 106 In considering the
scope of public access to judicial proceedings, the Court found
there is merely a common-law rule of proceedings being open to
the public, which is hardly the same as a constitutional right. 0 7
The Supreme Court looked mainly to the sixth amendment for
authority. "Our judicial duty in this case is to determine
whether the common-law rule of open proceedings was incorpo-
rated, rejected, or left undisturbed by the sixth amendment....
There is no question that the sixth amendment permits and
even presumes open trials as a norm."' 0 8 At this point, however,
the Court drew a distinction between a trial and a pretrial pro-
ceeding, and even assuming, arguendo, that there was a com-
mon-law right of the public to attend criminal trials embodied in
the sixth and fourteenth amendments, there was still no evi-
dence to support a public constitutional right to attend a pre-
trial proceeding. 09
Justice Stewart briefly addressed the first and fourteenth
amendment implications, but determined that this issue did not
have to be decided by this Court in the abstract." 0 He felt that
the state nisi prius court had considered the circumstances and
properly balanced the first amendment right of access with the
sixth amendment guarantee of a fair trial, which might have
been endangered had the suppression hearing been made pub-
lic.' Furthermore, Justice Stewart pointed out, the public had
access to the suppression hearing transcript after the danger of
pretrial prejudice was gone, so that the first and fourteenth
amendments were not violated." 2
pants in the litigation. Thus, because of the great public interest in jury trials as
the preferred mode of fact-finding in criminal cases, a defendant cannot waive a
jury trial without the consent of the prosecutor and judge.
106. Id. at 383, 384.
107. Id. at 384.
108. Id. at 385.
109. Id. at 385, 387-91. In fact, Justice Stewart found evidence in early common law
commentaries that the public did not have a right of access to pretrial proceedings. See
id. at 387-91 and accompanying notes.
110. Id. at 391-93.
111. Id. at 392-93.
112. Id. at 393.
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Agreeing with the majority opinion, Justice Powell
presented his view in a concurring opinion, and concluded that
the petitioner's reporter"' had a right of access to the pretrial
suppression hearing.'1 4 Justice Powell recalled his dissenting
opinion in Saxbe v. Washington Post Co." 5 in which he dis-
cussed the role of the press in connection with the first amend-
ment function of protecting public discussion of governmental
proceedings."' While Justice Powell recognized that there is not
an absolute right of access to judicial proceedings," 7 he also
noted that it is usually the trial courts which must determine
whether or not closure is justified."' According to Justice Pow-
ell, the Supreme Court should identify the constitutional stan-
dard by which the trial judges may be guided." 9 In his opinion,
the best course would be a:
113. Justice Powell emphasized the importance of suppression hearings in certain
cases. Oftentimes, as did happen in this case, there was no trial due to the fact that the
suppression hearing resulted in plea bargaining and guilty pleas being entered. "In view
of the special significance of a suppression hearing, the public's interest in this proceed-
ing often is comparable to its interest in the trial itself." Id. at 397 n.1 (Powell, J.,
concurring).
114. Id. at 397 (Powell, J., concurring).
115. 417 U.S. 843, 850 (1974). In this case, the Court held in a 5-4 decision that the
prohibition by the Federal Bureau of Prisons of interviews between the press and indi-
vidual inmates of federal medium and maximum security prisons did not violate the first
amendment.
116. Justice Powell believed that the press has a vital role to play:
An informed public depends on accurate and effective reporting by the news
media. No individual can obtain for himself the information needed for the in-
telligent discharge of his political responsibilities .... In seeking out the news
the press therefore acts as an agent of the public at large. It is the means by
which the people receive that free flow of information and ideas essential to in-
telligent self-government. By enabling the public to assert meaningful control
over the political process, the press performs a crucial function in effecting the
societal purpose of the first amendment.
Id. at 863 (Powell, J., dissenting). For a further discussion concerning the role of the
press see infra notes 198-201 and accompanying text.
117. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 398 (Powell J., concurring). This right
is limited "both by the constitutional right of defendants to a fair trial ... and by the
needs of government to obtain just convictions and to preserve the confidentiality of
sensitive information and the identity of informants." Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. But see, id. at 403-06 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). "[T]he lower courts are
under no constitutional constraint either to accept or reject those procedures. They re-
main ... free to determine for themselves the question whether to open or close the
proceeding." Id. at 405. See also id. at 405-06 n.2.
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[F]lexible accommodation between first and sixth amend-
ment rights which are protected from state-law interfer-
ence by the fourteenth amendment-an accommodation
under which neither defendants' rights nor the rights of
members of the press and public should be made
subordinate .... The question for the trial court, there-
fore, in considering a motion to close a pretrial suppres-
sion hearing is whether a fair trial for the defendant is
likely to be jeopardized by pdblicity, if members of the
press and public are present and free to report prejudi-
cial evidence that will not be presented to the jury.120
While the Court had clearly affirmed the closure order in
Gannett on sixth amendment grounds, first amendment implica-
tions of open judicial proceedings remained in a state of confu-
sion.121 One year later, the Justices again encountered the public
access question in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia. 22
Although the Court was unable to render a majority opinion, 28
the Justices, nevertheless, clearly established that the Constitu-
tion guarantees the public and the press the right to attend
criminal trials. Chief Justice Burger, speaking for the plurality,
held that "[a]bsent an overriding interest articulated in findings,
the trial of a criminal case must be open to the public. 1 24
The Richmond case stemmed from a prior trial in which the
defendant, Stevenson, had been charged with murder and con-
victed at his first trial, which was reversed on appeal.1"6 The sec-
ond and third retrials both resulted in mistrials, and at the
fourth trial, the judge granted a motion by the defendant's coun-
120. 443 U.S. at 400 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell felt the trial court ap-
plied a standard similar to the one he expounded, and in doing so, correctly determined
that closure was appropriate. See id. at 401-03 (Powell, J., concurring).
121. See Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 602, nn.1-2 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring).
122. 448 U.S. 555.
123. Chief Justice Burger delivered the plurality' opinion, joined by Justices White
and Stevens. Justices White and Stevens also entered concurring opinions. Justice Mar-
shall joined Justice Brennan in his opinion concurring in judgment. Justices Stewart and
Blackmun filed opinions concurring in judgment while Justice Rehnquist filed a dissent-
ing opinion. Justice Powell did not take part in the consideration or decision of the case.
Id. at 558.
124. Id. at 581.
125. Id. at 559.
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sel that the trial be closed to the public. 1 2  Although no one ob-
jected at the time the motion was granted, appellants, Richmond
Newspapers, Inc., et al., moved that same day to have the clo-
sure order vacated. 27 The hearing on the motion, treated as part
of the trial, was also closed and the court refused to grant appel-
lants' motion to vacate.128 At the conclusion of this trial, the de-
fendant was found "not guilty" and released. 29 Appellants were
allowed to intervene nunc pro tunc and, failing to find relief in
the Virginia state courts, sought review by the Supreme Court,
which granted certiorari. 30
In the plurality decision, Chief Justice Burger traced the
common-law tradition that criminal trials are presumptively
open to the public,' which ensures the fairness of trials and
increases the public's awareness and understanding of the judi-
cial system.1 2 He mentioned the role of the press in reporting
judicial proceedings upon which the public has come to rely for
information.' s As the majority of the Court in Gannett held
that the sixth amendment did not give the public or the press
the right of access to a pretrial hearing,' 3' so in Richmond the
Court also refused to find that the first amendment explicitly
protected the right of the public to attend criminal trials. 3 5
Chief Justice Burger did conclude that there is a presumption of
openness in criminal trials. 6 However, he continued his analy-
126. Id. at 559-60. Reporters for Richmond Newspapers, Inc. were present in the
courtroom before the trial began. When the motion for closure was made, the trial judge
checked to see whether the prosecution had any objections. Finding none, the judge
granted the motion. The record does not reflect that anyone objected, including Rich-
mond Newspapers' reporters. Id.
127. Id. at 560.
128. Id. at 560-61. The trial court did not consider whether there were any available
alternatives to closure. "At the closed hearing, counsel for [Richmond Newspapers] ob-
served that no evidentiary findings had been made by the court prior to the entry of its
closure order and pointed out that the court had failed to consider any other, less drastic
measures within its power to ensure a fair trial." Id. at 560.
129. Id. at 562.
130. Id. at 562-63.
131. Id. at 564-69.
132. Id. at 569-73.
133. Id. at 572-73. This passage, to a certain extent, echoes some of Justice Powell's
views in his concurring opinion in Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 397-403. See
supra notes 113-16 and accompanying text.
134. 443 U.S. at 394.
135. Id. at 379-87.
136. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 573.
218 [Vol. III
COMMENTS
sis with special attention devoted to first amendment implica-'
tions, by focusing on whether the Constitution, without an ex-
plicit provision, provides a guarantee of public access to criminal
trials. 137
In expressing the view that the exclusion of the .public from
criminal trials is sharply limited by the first amendment, the
Chief Justice noted that the public would be unable to discuss
the criminal justice system unless it was allowed to attend and
observe the proceedings. 8
In guaranteeing freedoms such as those of speech and
press, the first amendment can be read as protecting the
right of everyone to attend trials so as to give meaning to
those explicit guarantees. "[T]he first amendment goes
beyond protection of the press and the self-expression of
individuals to prohibit government from limiting the
stock of information from which members of the public
may draw." Free speech carries with it some freedom to
listen. "In a variety of contexts this Court has referred to
a first amendment right to 'receive information and
ideas.'" What this means in the context of trials is that
the first amendment guarantees of speech and press,
standing alone, prohibit government from summarily
closing courtroom doors which had long been open to the
public at the time that amendment was adopted. 139
The first amendment encompasses more than just freedom of
speech and freedom of the press within its constitutional um-
brella. It includes the right of assembly and "the right of access
to places traditionally open to the public,"- such as the
courtroom. 14
0
Although the Constitution does not contain a provision spe-
cifically addressing public access to judicial proceedings,'4 Chief
Justice Burger noted that the Court had previously found other
137. Id. at 575.
138. Id. at 575-80.
139. Id. at 575-76 (citations omitted) (quoting First National Bank of Boston v. Bel-
lotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978) and Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762 (1972)).
140. Id. at 577-78. See generally id. at 577-78 (the right of assembly in connection
with the exercise of other first amendment guarantees).
141. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 604 (1982).
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rights implicit in the enumerated guarantees, and had accorded
them constitutional protection, such as the right of association,
the right to privacy, the right to travel, and the requirement in a
criminal trial that proof must be beyond a reasonable doubt.'42
In conclusion, the Court held that "the right to attend criminal
trials is implicit in the guarantees of the first amendment; with-
out the freedom to attend such trials, which people have exer-
cised for centuries, important aspects of freedom of speech and
of the press could be eviscerated."14 s
Concurring in the judgment, Justice Brennan explained that
in our constitutional system, the first amendment plays a "struc-
tural role" in protecting self-government through public debate
and discussion, which, if it is to be at all effective, must be in-
formed and uninhibited."4 The Supreme Court has not taken
the position that the first amendment always provides freedom
of access to information; therefore, the Court has recognized
that access to information concerning the government is limited
by the context and subject matter of that material and its rela-
tion to governmental security or confidentiality interests.1 '5 Im-
142. See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (right of association); Gris-
wold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (right to privacy); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618 (1969) (right to interstate travel); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (standard
of proof beyond a reasonable doubt). This is consistent with the view that the framers of
the Constitution drafted it with broad principles in mind, and thus the amendments
were not meant to be confined to a narrow, literal interpretation. 457 U.S. at 604.
143. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 580 (quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S.
665, 681 (1972)).
144. 448 U.S. at 587 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment). See also New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964); Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843,
862-63 (Powell, J., dissenting):
What is at stake here is the societal function of the first amendment in pre-
serving free public discussion of governmental affairs.... [The first amendment]
embodies our Nation's commitment to popular self-determination and our abid-
ing faith that the surest course for developing sound national policy lies in a free
exchange of views on public issues. And public debate must not only be unfet-
tered; it must also be informed. For that reason this Court has repeatedly stated
that first amendment concerns encompass the receipt of information and ideas
as well as the right of free expression.
Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 862-63.
Justice Learned Hand once said that the interest of the media in disseminating the
news, like the interest protected by the first amendment, "presupposes that right conclu-
sions are more likely to be fathered out of a multitude of tongues, than through any kind
of authoritative selection. To many this is, and always will be, folly; but we have staked
upon it our all." United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 392, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943).
145. See Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 584-86, 588 (Brennan, J., concurring)
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portant factors to be considered regarding the right of access are
tradition and the value of that accessibility. "' Justice Brennan
traced our "legacy of open justice" from early English history
and colonial state practices to constitutionally guaranteed rights,
which have vigorously been protected by the Supreme Court.
14 7
In addition to recognizing that judicial proceedings have inher-
ently been open to the public,'4 8 and that public proceedings are
beneficial,14 9 Justice Brennan also acknowledged the right of the
public to receive information about these proceedings without
necessarily being there in person. "While these decisions are im-
pelled by the classic protections afforded by the first amend-
ment to pure communication, they are also bottomed upon a
keen appreciation of the structural interest served in opening
the judicial system to public inspection."' 50
In Justice Brennan's view, however, trials and judges them-
selves play a more pivotal role in the administration of justice. It
is within these proceedings that law is made and constitutional
rights are upheld.' 5 ' The courts are, after all, one of the
branches of government and, as such, judicial proceedings are
"An assertion of the prerogative to gather information must accordingly be assayed by
considering the information sought and the opposing interests invaded."
146. 448 U.S. at 589 (Brennan, J., concurring):
First the case for a right of access has special force when drawn from an
enduring and vital tradition of public entree to particular proceedings or infor-
mation. Such a tradition commands respect in part because the Constitution
carries the gloss of history. More importantly, a tradition of accessibility implies
the favorable judgment of experience. Second, the value of access must be mea-
sured in specifics. Analysis is not advanced by rhetorical statements that all in-
formation bears upon public issues; what is crucial in individual cases is whether
access to a particular government process is important in terms of that very
process.
Id. at 589.
147. Id. at 589-93 (Brennan, J., concurring).
148. Id. at 592.
149. Id. at 593-97. See, e.g., supra, notes 26-41 and accompanying text.
150. 448 U.S. at 592 (footnote omitted). See also Landmark Communications, Inc. v.
Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 839 (1978) (discussion of governmental affairs); Nebraska Press
Assn. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976) (reporting of criminal proceedings); Time, Inc.
v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 478 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("with the judiciary as
with all other aspects of government, the first amendment guarantees to the people of
this Nation that they shall retain the necessary means of control over their institutions
that might in the alternative grow remote, insensitive, and finally acquisitive of those
attributes of sovereignty not delegated by the Constitution"); Cox Broadcasting v. Cohn,
420 U.S. 469, 492 (1975) (function of press in judicial proceedings).
151. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 595 (Brennan, J., concurring).
HUMAN RIGHTS ANNUAL
matters that are of interest to the community. 5 ' The fact that
the public may attend the trial, or learn about the proceedings
through the coverage of the press, serves not only as a check
upon the system, but also as an aid in the fact finding process. "
"Popular attendance at trials, in sum, substantially furthers the
particular public purposes of that critical judicial proceeding. In
that sense, public access is an indispensable element of the trial
process itself. Trial access, therefore, assumes structural impor-
tance in our 'government of laws.' ",154
Two years later Justice Brennan spoke for the majority,
which had adopted his structural approach to the public's right
of access, in Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court.l5 5 In con-
struing first amendment protections, made applicable to the
states through the fourteenth amendment, the Court held inva-
lid a Massachusetts statute15  which required a trial for a sex
offense to be closed when victims under the age of 18 were
testifying. 157
The trial court had issued an order excluding the public and
the press from the courtroom during the trial of the accused,
who was charged with raping three minors.'5 8 A Boston area
newspaper publisher, the appellant herein, challenged the clo-
sure order, eventually appealing to the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court en banc. 59 After the defendant was acquitted,
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court dismissed Globe's
appeal'6 stating, however, that the statute in question required
152. Id. at 596.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 597 (citations omitted) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 163
(1803)).
155. 457 U.S. 596. In this case, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of access to a
criminal trial which involved a sex-related offense.
156. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 278 § 16A (West 1981), provides in pertinent part:
At the trial of a complaint or indictment for rape, incest, carnal abuse or
other crime involving sex, where a minor under eighteen years of age is the per-
son upon, with or against whom the crime is alleged to have been committed,....
the presiding justice shall exclude the general public from the courtroom, admit-
ting only such persons as may have a direct interest in the case.
157. 457 U.S. at 610-11.
158. Id. at 598-99.
159. Id. at 600. Previously a justice of that Court had'conducted a hearing and de-
nied Globe's request for relief. Id. at 599-600.
160. Id. at 600 (since the trial had been completed, the Court considered the issue
moot).
[Vol. III
COMMENTS
closure only when victims under the age of 18 were testifying at
a sex-offense trial. 61
The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Massachu-
setts court and remanded the case for further consideration fol-
lowing the decision in Richmond Newspapers.6 2 On remand, the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court determined that its prior
interpretation of the Massachusetts statute was still valid, even
in light of the Richmond decision.16 On appeal, the Supreme
Court reversed. 64 Relying heavily upon the various opinions in
Richmond,16 5 Justice Brennan reiterated the two factors which
explain why the first amendment protects the right of public ac-
cess to criminal trials: there is first, the tradition that trials have
been open to the public, and second, the important role which
public access plays in the functioning of the administration of
justice.16 6 This right of access, however, is not absolute.'67
But the circumstances under which the press and public
can be barred from a criminal trial are limited; the
State's justification in denying access must be a weighty
one. Where, as in the present case, the State attempts to
deny the right of access in order to inhibit the disclosure
of sensitive information, it must be shown that the denial
is necessitated by a compelling governmental interest,
and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest."6 "
The Court discussed the State's interests in terms of two
general categories. The first interest consisted of "safeguarding
161. Id. (the matter of closure for the rest of the trial was within the discretion of the
trial court).
162. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
163. 383 Mass. 838, 423 N.E.2d 773 (1981).
164. 457 U.S. 596, 602.
165. 448 U.S. 555 (especially upon his own concurring opinion. See supra notes 144-
54 and accompanying text).
166. 457 U.S. at 605-06.
167. Cf. id. at 613-20 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). The Chief Justice viewed the major-
ity's, decision as interpreting the Richmond decision to hold that there is a "First
Amendment right of access to all aspects of all criminal trials under all circumstances."
Id. at 613. Chief Justice Burger notes that the Court will allow states to enact statutes
which are more narrowly tailored than the one in this case, but he still believes that the
Court's decision is "nevertheless a gross invasion of state authority and a state's duty to
protect its citizens. . . ." Id. at 612-13.
168. 457 U.S. at 606-07.
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the physical and psychological well-being of a minor," 169 which
the Court believed is a compelling interest. It is not necessary,
however, that a closure order be required under all circum-
stances. 170 A better approach, according to Justice Brennan,
would be for the trial court to determine whether the factors1
7 1
in each individual case mandate excluding the public in order to
protect those victims who are minors from further embarrass-
ment and trauma. 17 2
The second interest asserted by the State is "the encourage-
ment of minor victims of sex crimes to come forward and pro-
vide accurate testimony.' 7  As before, the Supreme Court did
not feel that the Massachusetts statute7 4 was narrowly tailored
enough to serve this interest.7  Thus, Massachusetts had not
demonstrated any interest which could justify a mandatory ex-
clusion during a minor victim's testimony.
7 6
Both Richmond and Globe reflect the Supreme Court's de-
parture from its prior attitude in Gannett 77 that the right to a
public trial is only personal to the accused and that the Consti-
tution does not include a right of the public to attend a criminal
trial. Furthermore, Richmond and Globe signify the formal rec-
ognition by the Supreme Court that the Constitution does guar-
antee the public the right of access to criminal trials. 78 It was
against the background of these decisions involving the issue of
public access to criminal trials and pretrial suppression hearings
that the Supreme Court addressed the question of whether the
169. Id. at 607.
170. Id. at 607-08.
171. See id. at 608 for a list of suggested factors to be considered by the trial court in
determining, on a case by case basis, whether closure is necessary.
172. Id. at 608.
173. Id. at 609.
174. See supra note 156.
175. 457 U.S. at 609-10. One important fact which the Court points out is that the
statute closes that portion of the trial during which the minor sex victim is testifying; it
does not prohibit access to the trial transcript or any other source of that testimony. Id.
at 610.
176. See, e.g., id. at 611 n.27.
177. 443 U.S. 368, 379-80.
178. See, e.g., 457 U.S. at 603 ("The first amendment is thus broad enough to encom-
pass those rights that, while not unambiguously enumerated in the very terms of the
amendment, are nonetheless necessary to the enjoyment of other first amendment
rights").
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public has the right to attend the voir dire17 9 in Press-Enter-
prise Co. v. Superior Court of Cal.1 80
III. PRESS-ENTERPRISE CO. V. SUPERIOR COURT OF CAL.
A. Background
The controversy in Press-Enterprise arose out of a trial in
the Superior Court of California, Riverside County, in which Al-
bert Greenwood Brown, Jr.' was convicted and sentenced to
death for the rape and murder of a teenage girl. 82 Before the
trial began, the voir dire examination of prospective jurors took
six weeks to complete. During this period, approximately three
days of "general voir dire" was open to the public and the
press.8 3 Press-Enterprise Co., the petitioner herein, moved
before the examination of prospective jurors began, that the voir
dire should not be closed to the public or the press, but the trial
judge denied the motion. 184
Petitioner submitted a motion, after the jury was selected,
to have a transcript of the voir dire examination released. Al-
though the trial judge acknowledged that there were only a few
jurors who had personal matters which were discussed in re-
sponse to questions on voir dire, he denied the motion, conclud-
ing that the privacy interests of the jurors must be protected. 85
Following the conviction and sentencing of Brown, petitioner
sought a writ of mandate in the California Court of Appeal to
require the trial court to release the transcript of the voir dire
proceedings. Petitioner's application was denied and the Califor-
nia Supreme Court refused to grant Petitioner's request for a
179. The definition of voir dire is "to speak the truth." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1412
(5th ed. 1979). It refers to a pretrial proceeding in which potential jurors are questioned,
in an attempt to find those who, are capable of deciding the issue(s) at trial without being
biased or prejudiced. For more information regarding the voir dire procedure, see Note,
People v. Williams: Expansion of the Permissible Scope of Voir Dire in the California
Courts, 15 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 381 (1981).
180. 464 U.S. 501.
181. The accused was a twenty-six year old black man. Young, Supreme Court Re-
port: Voir Dire Must Be Open to the Public, 70 A.B.A.J. 108, 112 (April 1984).
182. The victim was a fifteen year old white girl. Id.
183. 464 U.S. at 503.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 504.
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hearing.'8 6 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed
the lower court's decision. 187
B. Majority Opinion
Chief Justice Burger began the majority opinion by review-
ing historical evidence of the origins of the jury system, and re-
calling the decision four years earlier in Richmond18 8 which de-
termined that criminal trials have long been presumptively open
to the public.
In looking at the evolution of the trial by jury, the Chief
Justice concluded that "the process of selection of jurors had
presumptively been a public process with exceptions only for
good cause shown."' 8 9 This view is consistent with the Court's
position regarding the basic presumption that, by nature, the
criminal justice system is open to the public. One of the more
important factors involved is the actual selection of the jury, for
these people are the ultimate triers of fact. They are charged
with the responsibility of weighing the evidence, deciding the
facts, and determining the outcome of the trial. Realizing that it
is difficult to separate the community's right to have access to a
criminal trial from the accused's right to a fair trial, 90 Chief
Justice Burger stressed that the value of openness of the pro-
ceedings assures the basic principles of fairness, as well as the
appearance of fairness, both of which help maintain public con-
fidence in the judicial system.'
Many of the same factors are analyzed in connection with
access to the examination of the veniremen as were considered
with regard to the openness of criminal trials and pretrial hear-
ings. Such factors include the therapeutic value to the commu-
nity and the corresponding outlet for reactions and emotions,
the knowledge that offenders are being justly dealt with for their
transgressions, and the limited circumstances under which ac-
cess to criminal proceedings may be denied or restricted. 192 The
186. Id.
187. 459 U.S. 1169 (1983).
188. 448 U.S. 555.
189. 464 U.S. at 505.
190. Id. at 508.
191. Id. See supra notes 26-35 and accompanying text.
192. 464 U.S. at 508-10. See supra notes 36-41 and accompanying text.
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Supreme Court was quite specific in delineating the permissible
limitations on access:
The presumption of openness may be overcome only by
an overriding interest based on findings that closure is
essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tai-
lored to serve that interest. The interest is to be articu-
lated along with findings specific enough that a reviewing
court can determine whether the closure order was prop-
erly entered.193
While constitutional as well as policy considerations are
quite similar to those addressed by the Court in previous cases
concerning the question of accessibility, there is a distinguishing
characteristic. In Press-Enterprise, the Supreme Court focused
on the values of the first amendment and the historical context
in which it was enacted,' as opposed to the fifth19 5 or sixth
amendments. 96
It has long been recognized that "free speech and fair trials
are two of the most cherished policies of our civilization, and it
would be a trying task to choose between them."' 97 There is no
necessity, however, for forcing a choice between the first and
193. 464 U.S. at 510. Cf. Globe Newspapers Co. v. Supreme Court, 457 U.S. 596, 606-
07 (a state's "justification in denying access must be a weighty one .... [I]t must be
shown that the denial is necessitated by a compelling governmental interest, and is nar-
rowly tailored to serve that interest").
194. 464 U.S. at 509, n.8. ("[T]he question we address-whether the voir dire process
must be open-focuses on first, rather than fifth, amendment [Due Process] values and
the historical backdrop against which the First Amendment was enacted"). See id. at 516
(Stevens, J., concurring), ("The constitutional protection for the right of access that the
Court upholds today is found in the first amendment, rather than the public trial provi-
sion of the sixth") (Footnotes omitted).
195. U.S. v. Cianfrani, 573 F.2d 835, 847 (Due Process). See also supra, notes 65-75
and accompanying text. The fifth amendment due process clause has served, along with
the sixth amendment provision for a public trial, as the basis for the presumption "that
all adjudicative proceedings are open to the public." See also 573 F.2d at 847 n.3, noting
the Supreme Court's recognition that the due process clause of the fifth amendment
"demands appropriate regard for the requirements of a public proceeding in ... all adju-
dications through the exercise of the judicial power." (citing Levine v. United States,
362 U.S. 610, 616).
196. U.S. v. Sorrentino, 175 F.2d 721, 722 (Based upon examination of the sixth
amendment, the constitutional right to a public trial was held to apply to the entire trial,
including selection of the jury.) See also Cianfrini, 573 F.2d at 847 (discussion of the
sixth amendment as part of the basis for the presumption of public proceedings).
197. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 260 (1941).
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sixth amendments. These two constitutional provisions, and all
the rights which they encompass, are compatible, each yielding
to the other when circumstances so dictate. As Justice Brennan
noted, "I would reject the notion that a choice is necessary, that
there is an inherent conflict that cannot be resolved without es-
sentially abrogating one right or the other."' 98
People have a right to know how the judicial branch of gov-
ernment is functioning, that criminal trials are conducted openly
and fairly, that the ends of justice are being served. Secrecy is
inimical to the inherent system of fairness which the trial pro-
cess represents. Oftentimes the public is informed or made
aware of criminal proceedings through the reporting efforts of
the press. "A responsible press has always been regarded as the
handmaiden of effective judicial administration, especially in the
criminal field.. . . The press does not simply publish informa-
tion about trials but guards against the miscarriage of justice by
subjecting the police, prosecutors, and judicial processes to ex-
tensive public scrutiny and criticism."19 Through the media, the
public learns of the strengths and weaknesses of the judicial sys-
tem. While it is not the sole source of information, the press
nonetheless remains one of the prime distributors of the "news,"
with an important role to serve.2 00
Commentary and reporting on the criminal justice sys-
tem is at the core of first amendment values, for the op-
eration and integrity of that system is of crucial import
to citizens concerned with the administration of govern-
ment. Secrecy of judicial action can only breed ignorance
198. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 598, 611-12 (Brennan, J., concurring).
199. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350. Accord, Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532,
538-42.
200. While this article briefly discusses the function of the press with regard to the
right of access to criminal proceedings, a detailed analysis of either the role of the press
in all situations or the question whether the media should be entitled to greater first
amendment protection than ordinary citizens, is beyond the scope of this article. For
additional information in this regard, see Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 839-41 (1974)
(Douglas, J., dissenting); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 727-28 (Stewart, J., dissent-
ing); see generally Douglas, The Public Trial and the Free Press, 33 RocKY MTN. L. REV.
1 (1960); Green, The Press and the Judicial System: One Reporter's View, 16 AM.
CImu.L. REV. 497 (1979); Comment, Commonwealth v. Hayes, 54 TEMP. L.Q. 417 (1981);
Note, The Right to Attend, supra note 43, at 1313-20; Note, The Right of the Press to
Gather Information, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 838, 849-50 (1971); Note, The Rights of the Pub-
lic and the Press to Gather Information, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1505, 1506 (1974).
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and distrust of courts and suspicion concerning the com-
petence and impartiality of judges; free and robust re-
porting, criticism, and debate can contribute to public
understanding of the rule of law and to comprehension of
the functioning of the entire criminal justice systm, as
well as improve the quality of that system by subjecting
it to the cleansing effects of exposure and public
accountability. 01
As important as the role of the press may be, it must be
balanced with the sixth amendment guarantee to a fair trial.
Prior restraints on speech, such as limiting the coverage of the
press in all criminal proceedings, violate the Constitution.0 2 The
right of the accused, however, to a fair trial by an impartial jury
must be protected, pursuant to the sixth amendment and the
Due Process Clause.208 The trial judge must take into considera-
tion the public's interest in having access to the proceedings, as
well as the somewhat speculative impact which that access
might have on the accused's rights under the sixth amendment,
when determining whether to grant a motion for closure.20
Chief Justice Burger, citing the majority opinion in Globe,20 5
emphasized that the State must be able to demonstrate a com-
pelling governmental interest which necessitates closure and, in
addition, that closure is narrowly tailored to serve that compel-
ling interest.206
In Press-Enterprise, the Supreme Court held that closure
was not warranted.07 While fundamental fairness in the process
of selecting a jury is a right to which the accused is entitled, and
though the prospective jurors do have some right of privacy,
these compelling interests were insufficient to support six weeks
of closed voir dire.2 0 8 The California court failed to consider al-
201. Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 587 (Brennan, J., concurring).
202. Id. at 556-62.
203. Id. at 551-56. See, Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 362-63.
204. Cf. Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 607 (Brennan, J., concurring). Agreeing that
these rights must be balanced, Justice Brennan stated that judges would be interjected
into censorship roles if they had authority to place prior restraints on trial publicity, in
view of the speculatively adverse effect it could have on the accused.
205. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 606-07.
206. 464 U.S. at 509-10.
207. Id. at 510.
208. Id. at 508-09.
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ternatives to closing the proceedings to the public and the press.
The Supreme Court recognized that in a case which in-
volved an alleged rape of a teenage girl, some questions on voir
dire might relate to sensitive areas209 which potential jurors
might not feel comfortable in answering honestly in the presence
of people other than the judge and counsel for the respective
parties.21 0 There are alternative ways to protect these privacy in-
terests other than the method chosen by the trial court. For ex-
ample, an individual could ask to speak with the judge, in cam-
era, on the record and with attorneys for both sides present, and
thus have the opportunity to explain the nature of their "pri-
vacy interest. ' 21 1 In this way, the risk of unnecessary closure
would be reduced, and, if necessary, that particular person could
be excused from serving on the jury.11 2 Another alternative is
limited closure, which is achieved by initially closing the voir
dire, thereby protecting the juror's privacy, and later "opening"
the proceeding by making available, within a reasonable amount
of time, a transcript of that proceeding, provided that the juror's
privacy interest would not be infringed.21' It might be necessary,
however, to either seal part of the transcript or withhold the
name of a juror in order to safeguard that individual's privacy.214
In this case, the trial court neither considered alternatives
to closure, nor released a transcript of the voir dire examination.
Furthermore, in his decision denying release of the transcript
even after the defendant, Brown, had been convicted and sen-
tenced to death, the trial judge mentioned, in reference to the
voir dire, that "while most of the information is dull and boring,
some of the jurors had some special experiences in sensitive ar-
eas that do not appear to be appropriate for public discus-
209. Such questions might include whether the prospective juror has ever been in-
volved in a situation similar to the one at trial, or if anyone of this juror's family has ever
been so involved. These issues would bear upon any conscious or subconscious prejudi-
cial feelings which the veniremen might be harboring towards persons, such as the de-
fendant in that particular trial, as well as personal attitudes with regard to specific
crimes in general.
210. 464 U.S. at 511-12.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 512. In addition, if part of the transcript is to be sealed, the trial judge
must articulate the reason why the information is deserving of privacy protection.
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sion. "215 The judge's statement did not justify either the initial
closure or the suppression of the transcript.
Once a criminal proceeding has begun, the threat of pretrial
publicity and the potential adverse effect it could have on the
prospective jurors are very real concerns which the trial judge
must take into consideration. When a jury has been selected,
however, there are ways to guard against, or at least minimize,
any possible influential impact on the jury, such as instructing
the jurors about their responsibility, or sequestering them, if
necessary. Likewise, the reasons for not making the voir dire
procedure open to the public may decrease in importance as
time goes on. Certainly after the trial is over and a verdict has
been rendered, considerable thought must be given to whether
closure is still necessary to protect the interests sought to be
protected in the beginning. As previously discussed, there are al-
ternatives to closure which must be carefully considered before a
trial judge decides to prohibit the public or the press from at-
tending the voir dire at the trial.
C. Concurring Opinions
Justice Blackmun concurred with the majority of the Court,
agreeing "that the privacy interest of a juror is a legitimate con-
sideration to be weighed by a trial court in determining whether
the public may be denied access to portions of a voir dire pro-
ceeding or to a transcript of that proceeding. 21 6 He emphasized,
however, that the Court does not address whether there is a con-
stitutional. right of privacy on behalf of potential jurors.2  While
the issue was not raised in this case, Justice Blackmun pointed
out that both the defendant and the state are interested in en-
couraging the full cooperation of the jury.1 8 Thus, in most cases,
a juror's privacy interests will be protected by virtue of the fact
that the defense and the prosecution want to ensure that jurors
will be candid in answering questions on voir dire.219
In his concurring opinion, Justice Stevens pointed out that
the basis for the protection of the right of access in this case is
215. Id. at 504.
216. Id. at 516 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
217. Id. at 513.
218. Id. at 515.
219. Id.
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the first amendment.220 Recalling the judgment of the Court in
Richmond,221 Justice Stevens emphasized the broad concerns
covered by the first amendment, including the protection of the
right of access to information concerning the functioning of gov-
ernment, which was endorsed by the Court in Globe. 2  Having
such access enables citizens to effectively participate in our sys-
tem of self-government.2 23 "[A] claim to access cannot succeed
unless access makes a positive contribution to this process of
self-governance. Here, public access cannot help but improve
public understanding of the voir dire process, thereby enabling
critical examination of its workings to take place."224
Justice Stevens acknowledged that the right of access is not
unlimited and may be restrained, in certain circumstances, by
the jurors' privacy interests or the content of the information
which has been sealed.225 While Justice Stevens saw this as a
possible limitation on access, Justice Marshall felt that this in-
sight into the answers provided by veniremen was still impor-
tant in light of the purpose underlying the right of public ac-
cess.22 6 In his view, the material which may be obtained from the
voir dire examination, albeit possibly sensitive information, re-
flects upon the impartiality of the jurors, and their ability to
consider the evidence from an unbiased viewpoint.227 An ideal
solution is to release the transcript of the voir dire examination,
but not identify the jurors, thereby giving effect to the public's
right of access while simultaneously protecting the privacy inter-
ests of the jurors.22
220. Id.
221. 448 U.S. at 558-81.
222. 457 U.S. 596.
223. Id. at 604.
224. 464 U.S. at 518 (Stevens, J., concurring).
225. Id. at 519. Justice Stevens noted that: "When the process of drawing lines be-
tween what must be open and what must be closed begins, it will be necessary to identify
at least some of the limits by reference to the subject matter of certain questions that
arguably may probe into areas of privacy that are worthy of protection." Id.
226. Id. at 520 (Marshall, J., concurring).
227. Id.
228. Id. This approach would satisfy Justice Marshall's standard so that "prior to
issuing a closure order, a trial court should be obliged to show that the order in question
constitutes the least restrictive -means available for protecting compelling state inter-
ests." (Emphasis in the original). This standard is more stringent than the majority's
view, which requires that a closure order, in order to pass constitutional muster, must be
"narrowly tailored" to serve a compelling governmental interest. Id. at 510 (Opinion of
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IV CONCLUSION
Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of Cal. upholds the
public's right of access to the voir dire examination of prospec-
tive jurors, and in accord with preceeding Court decisions de-
rives this right from the first amendment. It confirms the Su-
preme Court's commitment to protecting the penumbra of rights
which flow from the first amendment, while at the same time
protecting the sixth amendment rights of an accused or the pos-
sible privacy interests of prospective jurors. The Court's message
is clear. The public does have the right to know what the gov-
ernment is doing, so that people may intelligently discuss, effec-
tively monitor, and actively participate in our republican system
of government. Judicial proceedings are presumptively open,
and therefore, "[c]losed proceedings, although not absolutely
precluded, must be rare and only for cause shown that out-
weighs the value of openness."2 9 With the increased sensitivity
of issues to come before the courts in the future, the need to
balance all involved interests will be even more compelling.
Barbara Hricko Wait
Burger, C.J.).
229. Id. at 509.
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